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CONSTITUTIONAL RESTRAINTS ON
STATE RIGHT OF PUBLICITY LAWS
Abstract: Over the past fifty years, a new intellectual property right
called the right of publicity has evolved under state common law. This
Note explores a recurring concern hinted at by several lower courts and
dissenting opinions: that current. publicity laws offend parts of the
Constitution beyond the First Amendment and the Copyright Clause.
The existing hodgepodge of state statutory and common law that makes
up the right of publicity appears to be a minefield of constitutional
hazards. Courts must consider a variety of First Amendment, Copyright.
Clause, Commerce Clause, Due Process Clause, and Full Faith and
Credit. Clause issues when resolving publicity rights cases. This Note
argues that Congress could simplify this area of the law considerably for
plaintiffs, defendants, and courts by creating a preemptive federal right
of publicity. Alternatively, the right could remain state-based and still
avoid these issues through other approaches.
INTRODUCTION
Over the past fifty years, a new intellectual property right called
the right of publicity has evolved under state common law.' This
modern legal doctrine, where recognized, grants property rights to
everyone, allowing each person to control the commercial use of his
or her identity. 2 The right of publicity has been especially valuable to
celebrities because their identities carry substantial economic value. 3
The states have not universally recognized the right of publicity, 4
and it is not without its critics.' A recurring criticism is that it endan-
' Sec, cg.. j. TnomAs MCCARTHY, THE RICHEES Or PUBLICITY AND PRIVACY § 1:3, :4 (2d
ed. rev. Mar. 2002); Diane Leenheer Zimmerman, Who Put the Right in the Right of Publicity r,
9 Di:Nut:1,CA .). ART & ENT. 1. 35, 36-37 (1998).
2 See MGCAR•IllY, supra note 1, § 1:3.
3 See id. § 4:3; see also Sean Wood, Athlete Endorsements Sell, HAMILTON SPEC'EATOR, Aug.
26, 2002, at 1311, at 2002 WL 24455886 (describing several athletes' recent lucrative en-
dorsement contracts, such as tennis star Venus Williams's $40 million deal with Reebok).
4 See McCAR1111% supra note 1, § 6:3.
5 See, e.g., Michael Madow. Private Ownership of Public Image: Popular Culture and Publicity
Rights, 81 CAL L. REV. 127 passim (1993); Diane Leenheer Zimmerman, Fitting Publicity
Rights into Intellectual Property and Free Speech Theory: Sam, You Made the Pants Too Long!, 10
DEPAIIL-LCA J. ART & ENT. 1. 283, 286 n.8 (2000).
863
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gers First Amendment rights including freedom of speech.° A related
objection is that it privatizes too many ideas, facts, and types of infor-
mation that ought to remain in the public domain. ?
 Others assert that
federal rights granted under the Copyright Clause will preempt a
plaintiffs publicity rights in many cases. 8 The right of publicity re-
mains in a period of rapid development as courts and commentators
continue to refine its contours and rough edges.9
 Other evolving as-
pects of the law, such as constitutional jurisprudence, will also affect
its future development. I9
This Note explores a recurring concern hinted at by several lower
courts and dissenting opinions, one that has thus far escaped detailed
analysis: that current publicity laws offend parts of the Constitution
beyond the First Amendment and the Copyright Clause." The exist-
ing hodgepodge of state statutory and common law that makes up the
right of publicity appears to be a minefield of constitutional hazards. 12
Courts must consider a variety of First Amendment, Copyright Clause,
Commerce Clause, Due Process Clause, and Full Faith and Credit
Clause issues when resolving publicity rights cases." Congress could
simplify this area of the law considerably for plaintiffs, defendants,
and courts by creating a preemptive federal right of publicity." Alter-
natively, the right could remain state-based and still avoid these issues
through other approaches."
Section I of this Note describes the evolution of the right of pub-
licity, the uses of another's identity that may infringe upon it and the
6 See, e.g., Madow, supra note 5, at 134; Zimmerman, supra note 5, at 295-96.
7
 See, e.g., Madow, supra note 5, at 138-46; Zimmerman, supra note 5, at 289-90.
a See, e.g., Wendt v. Host Int'l, Inc., 197 F.3d 1284, 1286 (9th Cir. 1999) (denial of mo-
tion for rehearing) (Kozinski, J., dissenting) (arguing that copyright holder's right to ex-
ploit the characters played by plaintiff actors should preempt their state publicity rights);
Baltimore Orioles, Inc. v. Major League Baseball Players Ass'it, 805 F.2d 663, 676, 79 (7th
Cir. 1986) (holding that baseball club's copyright in game telecast preempted players'
right of publicity in their athletic performances). But see Midler v. Ford Motor Co., 849
F.2d 460, 462 (9th Cir. 1988) (holding that federal copyright protection for sound record-
ings did not preempt plaintiff's state publicity right to prevent unauthorized use of sound-
alike singer); Schuyler M. Moore, Putting the Brakes on the Right of Publicity, 9 UCLA ENT. L.
REV. 45, 55-56 (2001) (arguing copyright should not preempt publicity rights because they
protect different interests).
9 See MCCAR'IllY, supra note 1, § 1:38.
la See id.
11 See infra notes 153-321 and accompanying text.
12 See infra notes 153-321 and accompanying text.
13
 See infra notes 153-321 and accompanying text.
14 See infra notes 322-330 and accompanying text.
16 See infra notes 331-333 and accompanying text.
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uses it permits, and the conunon justifications for, and criticisms of,
the right."' Section II reviews selected case law involving constitutional
issues raised by the right of publicity and related torts." Section III
then examines constitutional limits on the right of publicity imposed
by the Commerce, Due Process, and Full Faith and Credit clauses and
discusses ways to avoid the apparent conflicts. 18
I. THE RIGHT OF PUBLICITY
Professor McCarthy, author of the comprehensive treatise on the
rights of publicity and privacy, defines the right of publicity as "the
inherent right of every human being to control the commercial use of
his or her identity." 19 It is an intellectual property right derived under
state law, the infringement of which creates a cause of action for the
tort of unfair competition.2° Every human being has a right of public-
ity; it is generally not limited to celebrities. 21
In most states that recognize it, the right of publicity is a de-
scendible and assignable property right. 22 Thus, it also protects
against unauthorized post-mortem use of a deceased's identity." Most
states that recognize a post-mortem right of publicity limit its duration
to no longer than 100 years after death. 21 Tennessee's publicity law,
however, provides protection for as long as the right holder continu-
ally exploits the commercial value of the identity."
A. History
Several law review articles and key judicial opinions considerably
influenced the creation of the right of publicity. 26 It traces its origin to
16 See infra notes 19-152 and accompanying text.
17 Sec infra notes 153-268 and accompanying text.
18 See infra notes 269-336 and accompanying text.
19 MCCARTHY, supra note 1, § 1:3.
2° Id.
21 Id. But see Lanclham v. Lewis Galoob Toys, Inc., 227 F.3d 619, 624 (6th Cir. 2000)
(stating that only plaintiffs who can show their identities have commercial value can assert
the right, but noting that the complained-of use may be enough evidence in itself to show
that plaintiff's identity had sufficient commercial value to assert the right).
22 Sec McCAwriIv, supra note 1, §§ 9:17, 10:13. New York and Wisconsin courts have
explicitly held that the right is not descendible. Id. § 9:19.
26 See id. § 9:17.
24 See irl. § 6:8.
25 Zimmerman, supra note 1. at 46.
26 See hi c.CA tmtv, supra note 1, § 1:4.
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several of the same sources as the right to privacy. 27
 in 1890, Samuel
D. Warren and Louis D. Brandeis published a seminal article in the
Harvard Law Review titled The Right to Privacy.28 The authors argued
that unauthorized public disclosure of truthful but embarrassing facts
about one's private life causes an affront to one's human dignity.29
Relying on principles of natural law, they argued that anyone so
harmed should have a remedy at law s° In 1905, state courts began
adopting aspects of Brandeis and Warren's theory, holding that com-
mon law should protect such privacy rights. 31 Where courts rejected
the theory, some state legislatures enacted right to privacy statutes to
protect the right, such as took place in New York.32
Courts and commentators struggled, however, with the idea and
semantics of applying the right to privacy ,
 toward celebrities—indi-
viduals who actively sought the limelight. 33 Celebrities presented a
stark contrast to the typical right to privacy plaintiff who sought to be
"left alone."34
 Judge Jerome Frank resolved this incongruity by coin-
ing the term "right of publicity" in a 1953 United States Court of Ap-
peals for the Second Circuit case, Haelan Laboratories, Inc. v. Topps
Chewing Gum, Inc. 33
 The parties were two baseball card manufacturers
and the case turned on whether a baseball player could assign exclu-
sive rights to produce a card with his photograph to one of the coni-
panies. 36
 The court ruled that this right of publicity was indeed as-
signable and, unlike the right to privacy, was not a solely personal
interest.37
On the heels of this decision, Professor Melville B. Nimmer wrote
an influential article that began to flesh out this nascent right. 38
 In his
article, Nimmer explained that the right to privacy provided in-
sufficient protection for the commercial value of one's identity be-
27 See id.
28 Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right To Privacy, 4 HARV. L. kr.v. 193
(1890).
29 See id. at 196.
9° See id. at 213.
McCattmv, supra note 1, § 1:17.
92 See id. § 1:16.
"See id. § 1:7.
54 Id.
95 202 F.2d 866, 868 (2d Cir. 1953).
36 See id. at 867.
37 See id. at 868-69.
" See Melville B. Nimmer, The Right of Publicity, 19 LAW & COWITAIP, PROBS. 203
(1954).
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cause it focused on prevention of feelings of indignity and embar-
rassment that are often not present in cases involving celebrities. 39 He
also advanced arguments for why this new right should be an assign-
able property right, distinguished it from unfair competition law, ar-
gued that everyone has a right of publicity, and offered a policy
justification for the right.°
In 1960, Professor William Prosser wrote another prominent arti-
cle in which lie analyzed privacy law and divided it. into four distinct
torts: intrusion, disclosure, false light and appropriation. 41 Prosser's
article was so influential that the 1977 Restatement (Second) of Torts
adopted his four categories as an accurate restatement of the law. 42
There is universal judicial acceptance of Prosser's categorization and
some state legislatures have gone so far as to codify his framework in
their statutory law.°
The intrusion tort focuses on physical invasion into the plaintiff's
private affairs," The disclosure tort is similar to the privacy interest
described by Warren and Brandeis, focusing on the public disclosure
of embarrassing private facts. ° The false light tort is similar to defa-
mation, focusing on the harm that results from presenting the plain-
tiff to the public in such a way that the public is likely to have an ob-
jectionable misperception of the plaintiff. °
Prosser's fourth tort of invasion of privacy by appropriation closely
resembles the right of publicity. 47
 It focuses on unauthorized use of
the plaintiff's identity for commercial purposes with resultant harm to
his or her dignity and peace of mind. ° Prosser's appropriation privacy
tort differs, however, from the right of publicity in two important
ways.° First, the privacy right is a personal interest whereas the public-
ity right is an assignable property right. 59 Second, courts measure the
harm from appropriation by the degree of affront to the plaintiff's
39 See id. at 203-04.
4° Id. at 216, 217; see id. at 210-14,215-16.
41 William L. Prosser, Privacy, 48 CAL. L. REV. 383,389 (1960).
42 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) or TORTS §§ 652B—E (1977); sec McCARTny, supra note 1,
§ 1:24.
43 MCCARTHY, Slip? note 1, § 1:24.
44 Prosser, supra note 41, at 389-92.
45 Id. at 392-98.
46 Id. at 398-401.
47 See McCAtcritY, supra note 1, § 1:23.
48 See Prosser, supra note 41. at 401-07.
49 SCC MCCARTHY, supra note 1, §§ 5:61, :65.
5° Id. § 5:65.
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dignity and peace of mind, whereas they measure the harm from in-
fringement of the publicity right by the economic value of the unau-
thorized use.51
B. Recognition
Over the past twenty-five years, the right of publicity has met with
increasing, though not universal, recognition by courts, the bar,
members of the legal academy, and state legislatures. 52 As of March
2002, twenty-eight states had provided their citizens with a remedy for
infringement of the right of publicity. 53 Eleven states provide only
common law protection;54
 ten states , provide only statutory protec-
tion;55 and seven states provide both,5° Courts in New York, Nebraska,
and Puerto Rico have held that a common law right of publicity does
not exist in those territories. 57
Even though the right of publicity is currently limited to state law,
federal courts have nevertheless contributed to its evolution through
the exercise of both their diversity jurisdiction and their supplemental
jurisdiction with federal claims (such as those for Lanham Act sec-
tion 43(a) violations involving false representation or service mark
infringement). 58 Federal courts seem comfortable deciding issues of
first impression involving state publicity rights, although state courts
have subsequently criticized or overruled some of these decisions."
51 See id. § 5:59.
52 See id. §§ 1:35, 6:4, 6:7; Zimmerman, supra note 1, at 38 n.11.
53 MCCARTHY, supra note 1, § 6:3.
54 Id. (Arizona, Alabama, Connecticut, Georgia, Hawaii, Michigan, Minnesota, Mis-
souri, New jersey, Pennsylvania and Utah).
55 Id. 11,9. (Indiana, Massachusetts, Nebraska, Nevada, New York, Oklahoma, Rhode Is-
land, Tennessee, Virginia and Washington). But see Zimmerman, supra note I. at 41 n.19
(asserting that several of these states' statutes create a right more akin to that protected by
the privacy attribution tort than to the right of publicity).
55 MCCARTHY, supra note 1, § 6:3 n.8 (California, Florida, Illinois, Kentucky, Ohio,
Texas and Wisconsin).
57 See id. § 6:3,
55 Sec 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (2000) (Lanham Act § 43(a)); McCAtcrnv, sum note 1,
§§ 6:130, :131. See infra text accompanying notes 129-145 for further discussion of the
Lanham Act.
69 See, e.g., White v. Samsung Elecs. Am., Inc., 971 F.2d 1395, 1397-99 (9th Cir. 1992)
(holding that California common law protects plaintiff's "identity" when the state's courts
had not interpreted it as broadly); Ackerman v. Ferry, No. B143751, 2002 WL 31506931,
*17 n.13 (Cal.App. 2 Dist. Nov. 12, 2002) (lamenting that the Ninth Circuit Court of Ap-
peals opinion regarding the scope of California publicity law in White revealed almost no
analysis, limiting its value in determining legislative intent); Tennessee ex re/. Elvis Presley
Inel Meal Found. v. Crowell, 733 S.W.2d 89, 97, 99 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1987) (holding that
2003]	 Constitutional Restraints on State Right of Publicity Laws 	 869
In 1977, the United States Supreme Court decided Zacchini
Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., the only case it has heard thus far in-
volving the right of publicity. ° A news program televised a videotape
of a daredevil's entire fifteen-second performance at a local fair,
where he was shot from a cannon.6t The Ohio Supreme Court had
held that the First Amendment protected the telecast. 62 The United
States Supreme Court reversed, holding that the broadcast violated
the plaintiff's right of publicity because it contained his entire per-
formance without his consent. 63 The Court was concerned that such a
use could threaten the plaintiff's ability to earn a living as an enter-
tainer, and reasoned that this concern outweighed the strong First
Amendment protection afforded newscasts." Commentators agree
that the Court's ruling was so specific to the facts of the case that it
provides minimal guidance for the more common right of publicity
case, typically involving use of a likeness in advertising or on mer-
chandise.° But Zucchini does denote the Court's recognition of the
validity of at least a limited state publicity right. 66
In 1995, the Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition incorporated
the right of publicity in sections 46 through 49, 67
 It uses the phrase
"for purposes of trade" to describe the types of uses that trigger in-
fringement.68 This phrase presumably covers use in advertising, on
products, or in association with services. 69
Tennessee common law recognizes a post-mortem right of publicity. overruling a 1980
Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals decision). The author has been unable to locate any case
where a federal court has certified a novel question of state right of publicity law to a
state's highest court for resolution. When the Ninth Circuit decided White, California had
no such certification process in place. See generally Jerome I. Braun, A Certification Rule for
California, 36 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 935 (1996) (describing certification and proposing
such a process for California). The U.S. Supreme Court has urged that lower federal
courts strongly consider certification in cases involving state laws whose interpretation is
unclear to avoid the potential of a federal court deeming the law unconstitutional due to
an overly-broad reading. See Arizonans for Official English v. Arizona, 520 U.S. 43, 75-79
(1997).
60
 433 U.S. 562 (1977).
61 Id. at 563-64.
62 Id. at 565.
63 See id. at 575.
" Sec id. at 575-76, 578-79.
65 See. e.g., McCurntv, supra note 1, § 8:27; Zimmerman, supra note 1, at 49-50.
66 See, e.g., Zacchini, 433 U.S. at 577; Waits v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 978 F.2d 1093, 1109-10 (9th
Cir. 1992).
67 RESTATEMENT (TI1IRo) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION §§ 46-49 (1995).
65 Id. § 46.
66 See MCCARTHY, supra note 1, § 1:35.
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The American Bar Association has formulated a model statute
that, if enacted, would create a federal right of publicity. i 0
 A federal
right could address some of the problems inherent in a right of pub-
licity derived from state law. 71
 Such problems include idiosyncrasies in
the protection offered by different states under common or statutory
law, questions of which state's law controls a controversy and the po-
tential for plaintiffs to engage in forum shopping to maximize their
rights. 72
 The statute could also resolve some of the concerns this Note
explores regarding the constitutionality of state publicity laws under
the Commerce, Full Faith and Credit, and Due Process Clauses. 75
C. Infringing and Non-infiinging Uses
infringement of the right of publicity occurs when one makes
commercial use of another's identity without permission. 74
 To estab-
lish a prima facie case of infringement, the plaintiff must satisfy several
elements that can vary from state to state.' 5
 These elements typically
include a showing that the complained-of use is commercial, that it is
unauthorized, that it identifies the plaintiff, and that it is likely to
harm the economic value of the plaintiff's identity. 76
The clearest cases of infringement occur when the defendant uses
plaintiff's identity in an advertisement for its goods or services without
permission. 77
 Use of plaintiff's identity on merchandise or in connec-
tion with a service may also satisfy the commercial use element.' 8
 Be-
cause infringement requires that the plaintiff be identifiable from de-
fendant's unauthorized use, courts have often found infringement
where the defendant used elements of a plaintiff's persona other than
actual name or likeness. 79
 Uses that approximate a plaintiff's distinc-
70 See Zimmerman, supra note 1, at 38 n.11.
71
 See id.
72 See, e.g., MCCARTHY, supra note 1, § 11:8; Richard S. Robinson, Preemption, The Right
of Publicity, and a New Federal Statute, 16 CARDOZO ARM & ENT. L.J. 183, 201-07 (1998);
Melinda R. Eades, Note, Choice of Law and the Right of Publicity: Domicile as an Essential First
Step. 66 BROOK. L. REV. 1301 passim (2001) (arguing that the law of plaintiffs place of
domicile should first determine the existence of the right, then a second state's law may
determine its scope).
" See infra notes 269-330 and accompanying text.
74 See MCCARTHY, supra note 1, at v.
75 See id. § 3:2.
76 See id.
" See id. § 7:6.
78 14.1cCARTnY, supra note 1, § 7:19. But see Zinuuerman, supra note 1, at 61-65.
79 Sec MCCARTHY, supra note 1, § 4:45.
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live voice, performing style, catch phrase, name, nickname, appear-
ance, fictional characterization, or objects or settings closely associ-
ated with the plaintiff have all been sufficient for a finding of in-
fringemen t. 8°
In contrast, one can freely make unauthorized non-commercial
uses of another's identity because such uses do not implicate the right
of publicity, which is limited to controlling "commercial uses". 81 Per-
mitted non-commercial uses typically include use of a person's iden-
tity in news reports, entertainment, commentary, or literary works
(both fiction and non-fiction)." Some limited categories of use, al-
though commercial, do not infringe on the right of publicity because
of their incidental nature!" For example, an advertisement for a mu-
sic magazine that features covers of back issues where the musicians
that appeared on the covers are identifiable would not typically in-
fringe on those musicians' publicity rights." Courts may also permit
uses that are fleeting or insignificant, such as where a full-length film
shows one's face for a few seconds.'"
D. Tension with the First Amendment
The First Amendment to the Constitution provides in pertinent
part that "Congress shall make no law ... abridging the freedom of
speech ...."13b The right of publicity's restriction on the unauthorized
commercial use of one's identity prohibits certain forms of expres-
sion; it therefore potentially conflicts with the freedom of speech the
First Amendment seeks to protect. 87
Courts apply a balancing test to determine whether the First
Amendment preempts the right of publicity where the unauthorized
use is commercial, such as in an advertisement or on actual merchan-
88 See id.
81 See id. § 1:35.
82 See id.
83 See id. § 7:13.
84 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 47 cult. a (1995) ("A maga-
zine soliciting subscriptions ... may refer to a past article about a particular celebrity as an
illustration of the magazine's customary con ten t."); MCCARTHY, supra note 1, § 7:13-15.
85 See, e.g., Preston v. Martin Bregman Prods.. Inc., 765 F. Stipp. 116,118-19 (S.D.N.Y.
1991); NIcCARTItY, supra note 1, § 7:18.
88 U.S. CONST. amend. 1. The Fourteenth Amendment makes this prohibition applica-
ble to the States as well. See Palko r. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319,326-27 (1937).
87
 See, e.g., Cardtoons, L.C. v. Major League Baseball Players Ass'n. 95 F.3d 959,970-72
(10th Cir. 1996); Zimmerman, SlIpra note 5. at 295.
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dise. 88
 The degree of protection the First Amendment provides in any
given circumstance will depend on the content of the challenged
speech and the countervailing interest asserted." The First Amend-
ment may preempt the right of publicity in uses that enjoy the higher
levels of First Amendment protection, such as those a court classifies
as informing• or entertaining." Entertainers, for example, should
typically be able to mimic or parody the distinctive identities of other
performers, because First Amendment considerations predominate in
such instances of pure entertainment. 91
Such preemption may not take place, however, in uses that a court
classifies as commercial speech because the Constitution gives more
attenuated protection to such speech. 92
 In such cases, the commercial
speech doctrine might not immunize a use that infringes on the right
of publicity." Courts have typically refused to protect a vendor's unau-
thorized use of a plaintiff's identity on T-shirts, coffee mugs, lunch
boxes, dartboards, playing cards, and the like.94 Courts are reluctant
to extend free speech protection to such objects because speakers
usually do not choose them as media to convey their socially sig-
nificant speech. 95
 Such objects serve other intrinsic functions, whereas
traditional communicative.
 media such as newspapers, magazines,
books, and movies do not."
Other commentators argue that the buyer of such objects is a
speaker and the seller's effort to facilitate the buyer's speech should
therefore warrant protection.97
 Courts would likely credit this argu-
ment to protect political speech, which is entitled to the highest level
of constitutional protection, because one who enters into the political
arena essentially waives much of her rights of publicity and privacy."
The defendant in such a case, however, is a step removed from the
individual whose speech is entitled to protection; the plaintiff's inter-
est is not usually to stifle speech but to be paid for the use of her iden-
" Cardtoons, 95 F.3d at 970-72; see NIcCARTur,
 , supro note 1, § 7:3 at 7-4.
89 See NIcCARrtiv, supra note 1, § 8:12.
90 See id. § 7:3.
91 See id. § 8:111.
92 See id. § 7:3.
93 Id. § 8:17.
94 Sec McCairrnr, supra note 1, § 7:23.
9'5 Sec id. §§ 7:22, :23.
" See id.
97
 Sec id. § 7:21; Zimmerman, supm note 5, at 300.
" See MCCARTHY, supra note 1, § 7:21.
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tity; and any such speech is symbolic and therefore entitled to less
protection than pure speech.`'' '`' All of these factors may make a court
less willing to preempt the plaintiffs right of publicity in cases not
involving political messages. 100
Property rights arising from the right of publicity also typically
outweigh the claim to free speech in cases where the defendant uses
the plaintiff's identity as the vehicle to attract attention to its news or
entertainment message. 1Q1 As the First Amendment also gives indi-
viduals the right not to speak, a plaintiff may assert his or her right of
publicity to prevent others from using the plaintiff's property as a ve-
hicle for conveying their views if alternative methods of communica-
tion exist. IO2
E. Remedies
Plaintiffs can generally obtain injunctive relief enjoining defen-
dants from any further unauthorized use of their identities. ws To re-
cover monetary damages, however, a plaintiff must establish and
quantify the economic damage from the use. 1°4 If, for example, the
defendant used the plaintiffs image without permission in an adver-
tisement, one measure of damages would be what the defendant
would likely have had to pay to entice the plaintiff (or someone whose
identity had similar commercial value) to appear in the advertise-
ment. 105 Another possible measure of damages is the resultant loss of
economic value of the plaintiff's identity. 1°6 This could occur, for ex-
ample, if the complained-of use resulted in a reduced demand for
plaintiffs services. °7 In cases of willful infringement, such as where
the defendant knew the plaintiff abhorred celebrity endorsements
99 See id.
100 See id.
lot Id. § 8:32 at 8-48.
1 °'-' See id. §§ 8:6, :30. :32. :33.
1 °3 MCCARTHY, supra note I, § 11:21.
104 See lit§ 3:2.
m5 See id. § 11:32.
016 See id. § 11:33.
107 See id. For example, suppose Rawlings ran an unauthorized advertisement for its
baseball gloves featuring Boston Red Sox shortstop Nomar Garciaparra. Because of this
use, Garciaparra might be unable to convince Wilson to hire him to promote its baseball
gloves. A reasonable measure of the damages in this scenario, then, might be the going
price of a long-term endorsement contract between a baseball player with Garciaparra's
Alt-star status and a baseball glove company. See id.
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but used the plaintiff's identity in its advertising anyway, juries have
awarded, and courts have upheld, substantial punitive damages.' 68
F. Policy fitstifications
Commentators have advanced several public policy reasons to
recognize a right of publicity. 169
 These include justifications based on
natural rights and fairness, incentives, economic efficiency, and pre-
venting deception.' °
First, some consider the right of publicity to be a self-evident
property right in one's own identity.'" To them, the statement "my
identity is mine—it is my property, to control as I see fit" is intuitive.' 12
The right of publicity prevents others from unjustly free riding and
benefiting economically from the value one has built up in one's own
identity." s
There is also an incentive justification for the right of publicity.'' 4
This rationale asserts that giving individuals the exclusive right to
capitalize on the economic value they build up in their identity en-
courages them to invest in developing their skills and talents. 115 Such
investment results in socially desirable behavior, leading to a richer
society. 116
Some commentators also offer an economic efficiency theory to
justify the right of publicity.'" They argue that making an individual
the sole arbiter of how and when commercially to use his or her iden-
tity helps maximize its economic value." 8 If anyone who wants to use
the identity can do so at will, such use may dilute any cachet associ-
ated with the identity, resulting in a loss of economic value. 116 Grant-
ing property rights results in efficient allocation of scarce resources
m8 E.g., Waits, 978 F.2d at 1104-06 (affirming $2 million in punitive damages).
'IN See McCARTtiv, supra note 1,55 2:1—:8; see also Madow, supra note 5, at 178-240 (de-
scribing and critiquing such justifications at length).
ii° Sec MCCARTHY, supra note 1,55 2:6—:8.
1 " See id. § 2:2.
112 Id. § 2:1.
118 See id. § 2:2.
114 See id. § 2:6.
118 SeeMcCAwniv supra note 1.5 2:6.
116 See id.
117 See id. 5 2:7.
118 See id.
119 See id.
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and helps ensure that the resource goes to the highest and best use, 12°
Commentators contend the personal property right. thus avoids the
tragedy of the commons problem of public ownership. 121
A final justification is that assigning property rights in one's iden-
tity can help prevent deceptive commercial uses. 122 This argument
provides only modest justification, however, because one can infringe
the right of publicity without any use of deception, 123 The Lanham
Act also already protects against deceptive commercial uses. 124
G. Comparison, with Copyright and Trademark Law
The right of publicity differs in important ways from other intel-
lectual property rights such as copyright and trademark. 125 For exam-
ple, a primary distinction between the right of publicity and copyright
is that the latter covers "original works of authorship fixed in any tan-
gible medium of expression." 126 The right of publicity protects one's
identity in any form, not just a fixed manifestation of it, such as in a
coppightable photograph. 127 Personal identity is also outside the
statutory subject matter of copyright. 128
The right of publicity also differs from rights granted under
trademark law. 129 Trademark law, embodied in the Lanham Act, pro-
motes designation of source as a method of preventing consumer
confusion and encouraging quality control.'" To prove trademark
infringement a plaintiff must demonstrate likelihood of confusion. I31
Although certain uses of an individual's identity may confuse con-
sumers as to whether the individual is endorsing a product, an adver-
120 SeelriCCAR'IllY, supra note 1, § 2:7.
121 See id. The tragedy of the commons occurs when individuals waste public goods in a
mad dash to consume them before others do; private ownership can lead to more sensible
and efficient utilization. Sec generally Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons. 162 Sci-
ENCE 1234 (1968).
122 MCCAR•1111•, stipra note 1, § 2:8.
1 " See, e.g., Carritoons, 95 F.3d at 975; McCARTnv, supra note 1, § 2:8.
124 Sec. e.g., Carritoons. 95 F.3d at 975; McCAn -niv, supm note 1, § 2:8.
123 SCC,,41"C,6,41"'R'111V, suprn cote 1, § 1:3.
126 17 U.S.C. § 102(a); see McCAn .rnv, supra note 1, § 5:37.
127 SCE MCCAR'111Y, supra note 1. § 5:41,
128 1d. §§ 1:35, 5:41.
129 See id. § 1:3.
130 Sec McCia•niv, supra note 1, § 5:6.
131 Id, § 5:11.
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tiser can infringe an individual's right of publicity even when it is ob-
vious that the individual is not endorsing the product."'
The right of publicity is similar in several ways to laws protecting
against the dilution of trademarks.'" Both are creatures of state law
meant to protect intellectual property rights. I34
 Like intellectual
property laws in general, both are subject to limits imposed by the
First Amendment. 15 Both also serve to protect goodwill and commer-
cial value built up in the property against commercial uses that may
lessen the property's future value."' The state law in both cases repre-
sents a patchwork resulting from differing policy decisions of the
states, with some states refusing to recognize one or both of the doc-
trines and often-considerable discrepancies between the laws of any
two states. 157
The two doctrines also differ in significant ways. First, trademark
dilution has already made the leap from state law to federal law with
the enactment of the Federal Trademark Dilution Act of 1995
(FTDA), which did not explicitly preempt the state laws. 138
 Second,
the FTDA and state dilution statutes require a mark to be famous to
be entitled to dilution protection, whereas in many states even non-
celebrities have publicity rights." 9
 Hence, large, national or interna-
tional companies use the FTDA to protect against dilutive uses that
are often local in scope. m
 In contrast, individuals typically seek pro-
tection for infringement of their publicity rights against large, na-
152 See id.
153 See, e.g., Kristine NI. Boylan, The Corporate Right of Publicity in Federal Dilution Legisla-
tion, Part II, 82 J. I}A•1.. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC'Y 5, 32 (2000) (IT] he best analogy be-
tween trademark dilution and accepted, existing law rests with the right of publicity."). See
generally Stacey L. Dogan, An Exclusive Right to Evoke, 44 B.C. L. REV. 291 (2003).
134 See 4 J. THOMAS NICCART111*, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR ComPrrt-
-noN § 29:67 (4th ed. rev. Mar. 2003).
' 35
 Sec Mattel, Inc. v. MCA Records, Inc., 296 F.34 894, 900-01 (9th Cir. 2002); supra
notes 86-102 and accompanying text.
138 See 4 McCAttim, supra note 134, § 24:71.
' 37 See, e.g., id. §§ 24:75, :77—:82; MCCARTHY, supra note 1, §§ 6:3, :8.
'38
 15 U.S.C. §§ 1125(c), 1 127 (2000) (Lanhatn Act §§ 43(c), 45); see 4 NIcCAIrrnv, su-
pra note 134. §§ 24:82—:83, :90. For a brief history of dilution law leading up to the enact-
ment of the FTDA, see Moseley v. V Secret Catalogue, Inc., 123 S. Ct. 1115, 1122-23
(2003).
139 See 4 McCAtmtv, supra note 134, § 24:81. But el id. § 24:90 (noting that a trade-
mark dilution defendant's use must be in interstate commerce).
140 See. e.g., Moseley, 123 S. Ct. at 1119 (national lingerie retailer claiming trademark di-
lution against owners of an adult novelty store named "Victor's Secret" located in a Ken-
tucky strip mall); 4 NIcCA alive, supra note 134, g 24:68.
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Liana] or international companies. 141
 The typical dilution case pits a
plaintiff operating on a broader scale against a defendant operating
on a narrower scale; the typical publicity rights case has the opposite
profile. 142
 Third, the primary justification for trademark law is pre-
venting consumer confusion whereas the right of publicity focuses on
protecting an individual's property rights. 143 Fourth, compensatory
damages are generally available to publicity rights plaintiffs whereas
monetary damages are available under the FTDA only upon a finding
of willfulness:" Despite these differences, and because of the similari-
ties, this Note examines trademark dilution case law to supplement
the somewhat meager case law in the latter area, because some dilu-
tion cases address issues identical to those raised by the right of pub-
licit"5y. 
H. Criticism
The most common criticism of an expansive right of publicity is
that it is an unjustifiable restriction on free speech under the First
Amendment, 146
 Critics assert that celebrities serve as valuable cultural
touchstones that anyone should be free to use in formulating expres-
sive speech."' There must therefore be a substantial policy reason,
they argue, to remove celebrity personas from the public domain!"
Critics find the policy reasons offered for the right of publicity not
compelling enough to justify the limitations on freedom of speech
imposed by the right. 149
A second common criticism of the right of publicity is that it can
interfere with federal rights granted under the Copyright Act. 150 Crit-
141 See, e.g., Waits, 978 F.2d 1093 (singer suing international snack foods company);
Wendt v. Host Mel, Inc., 125 F.3d 806 (9th Cir. 1997) (actors suing international conces-
sionaire).
142 Compare Hyatt Corp. v. Hyatt Legal Servs., 610 F. Stipp. 381 (Ka Ill. 1985) (inter-
national hotel chain claiming trademark dilution against a regional legal services firm),
with White, 971 F.2d 1395 (game show hostess claiming right of publicity infringement
against international electronics corporation).
149 See MCCARTHY, supra note 1, § 5:6.
144 See 4 MCCARTHY, Mira note 134, § 24:99.
146 See infra notes 255-268 and accompanying text.
146 See, e.g., Madow, supra note 5, at 134; Zimmerman, supra note 5, at 292-94.
147 See, e.g., Madow, supra note 5, at 142-47.
148 See, e.g., Madow, supra note 5, at 134; Zimmerman, supra note 5, at 313.
149 See, e.g., Cardtoons, 95 F.3d at 976; Madow, supra note 5, at 238-40; Zimmerman, su-
pra note 5, at 313.
160
 Sec infra notes 196, 207-210 and accompanying text.
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ics argue that federal copyrights should preempt publicity rights aris
ing under state law in cases where the two conflict.'" Any other result,
critics also assert, would permit states to interfere with the federal
copyright system (over which the Constitution grants Congress exclu-
sive authority) thereby violating the dormant Copyright Clattse. 152
II. THE CONSTITUTION AND THE RIGHT OF PUBLICITY
Under the Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution, a
federal law preempts any state law that conflicts with it, rendering the
state law void.'" In addition to statutes passed by Congress, federal
law includes the provisions of the Constitution itself. 154 This Section
examines case law, involving the right of publicity and related com-
mercial torts, to identify constitutional limits that may apply to the
right of publicity under state law. 155
A. First Amendment Claims
In 1996, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit
case of Cardtoons, L.C. v. Major League Baseball Players Ass'n illustrated
some of the First Amendment concerns raised by the right of publicity
and called into question the justifications for the right.' 56 The court's
analysis is also applicable to other constitutional issues, which are the
principal focus of this Note. I57 In that case, the Tenth Circuit held
that Cardtoons' First Amendment right to parody baseball players
outweighed those players' rights under Oklahoma law.' 58 Cardtoons
sought declaratory judgment that its baseball cards portraying carica-
tures of major league baseball players and poking fun at their various
excesses did not infringe on the players' publicity rights, which the
players had assigned to the Major League Baseball Players Association
151 See, e.g., Baltimore Orioles, 805 F.2d at 676; Wendt, 197 F.3d at 1286 (Kozinski, J., dis-
senting).
152 See, e.g., Wendt, 197 F.3d at 1288 (Kozinsky, J., dissenting) ("[A] broad reading of
the state right of publicity runs afoul of the dormant Copyright Clause, which preempts
state intellectual property laws to the extent they 'prejudice the interests of other States.'"
(quoting Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546, 558 (1973) ) ); Eades, supra note 72, at 1328.
155 1 LAURENCE H. :TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 6-29 (3d ed. 2000).
154 See id. § 6-1.
155 See infra notes 156-268 and accompanying text.
156 95 F.3d 959, 976 (10th Cir. 1996); sec supra notes 109-124 and accompanying text.
157 See id. at 973-76; infra text accompanying notes 271-289.
158 1d. at 976.
2003]	 Constitutional Restraints on State Right of Publicity Laws 	 879
(MLBPA). 156 The court noted that neither of the First Amendment
accommodations in Oklahoma's statute, one for news, the other for
uses not directly connected with commercial sponsorship or advertis-
ing, applied to Cardtoons' use. 16 It stressed, however, that Cardtoons'
speech in this case was entitled to full protection under the First
Amendment because it. provided "commentary on an important social
institution."161 Because the court also held that Cardtoons had in-
fringed on the players' statutory publicity rights, it proceeded to "bal-
ance the magnitude of the speech restriction against the asserted gov-
ernmental interest in protecting the intellectual property right" to
determine which prevailed: 62
The Tenth Circuit. examined each of the common justifications
for the right of publicity and found them not to be strong enough,
independently or as a group, to justify the speech restriction in this
case.
163 In examining the incentive justification, the court reasoned
that "the additional inducement for achievement produced by public-
ity rights are [sic] often inconsequential because most celebrities with
valuable commercial identities are already handsomely compen-'
sated."164 The court reasoned that the efficient allocation of resources
justification is not persuasive in non-advertising uses involving parody
because celebrities would likely use their control over use of their
identities to suppress criticism: 65 The court. reasoned that the preven-
tion of consumer deception justification was without merit because
the Lanham Act provides for such protection and Cardtoons' cards
were not likely to deceive consumers anyway. " 6 The court summarily
rejected the natural rights justification, remarking, "blind appeals to
first principles carry no weight in our balancing analysis." The court.
then considered the just deserts justification, noted that celebrities
"are often not fully responsible for their fame," pointed out that the
players in this case were being parodied for socially undesirable be-
havior and concluded, "there is little right to enjoy [such] fruits." 68
159 Id. at 962-63.
160 Id. at 968.
161 See Cardtoons. 95 F.3d at 969.
182 Id. at 972.
163 See id. at 973-76.
164 Id. at 974.
185 Id. at 975.
18a Cardtoons, 95 F.3d at 975.
167
 Id.
168 Sec id. at 975-76,
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The court considered the related justification of preventing unjust
enrichment (free riding), but decided such a concern was inapplica-
ble because Cardtoons "added a significant creative component of its
own to the celebrity identity and created an entirely new product." 69
Finally, the court examined the prevention of emotional injury
justification and reasoned that both the Lanham Act and intentional
infliction of emotional distress laws adequately protected against such
mental anguish. u°
 The court concluded that "the effect of limiting
MLBPA's right of publicity in this case is negligible" and that the
justifications for the right of publicity are not nearly as compelling as
those offered for other forms of intellectual property, and are particu-
larly unpersuasive in the case of celebrity parodies."171 Accordingly,
the court affirmed the district court's finding that Cardtoons' First
Amendment right to free expression outweighed •114LBPA's right of
publicity!"
B. Su estions of Other Constitutional Claims
The United State Supreme Court has construed several provisions
of the Constitution, including the Commerce,'" Copyright," 4 and
Due Process" Clauses as imposing specific limits on. each state's abil-
ity to regulate activities that take place outside its borders.' tm
 These
restraints maintain the federal nature of the United States govern-
ment, in which each state retains sovereignty over matters that it has
not specifically delegated to the federal government through its ratifi-
cation of the Constitution. 177
169 See id. at 976.
170
	 id.
17 ' Cardtoons, 95 F.3d at 976.
172 Id. at 962.
175 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 (the Commerce Clause gives Congress the power "[I]o
regulate Commerce ... among the several States ....").
174 Id. cl. 8 (the Copyright Clause gives Congress the power "No promote the Progress
of ... useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors...the exclusive Right to their
respective Writings ....").
175 Id. amend. XIV, § 1 (the Due Process Clause requires that "[no] State [shall ...
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law • • ..").
176
 BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 585-86 (1996) (Due Process); Kassel v.
Consol. Freightways, 450 U.S. 662, 678-79 (1981) (Commerce Clause); Goldstein v. Cali-
fornia, 412 U.S. 546, 559 (1973) (Copyright Clause).
177 See U.S. CoNsT. amend. X ("The powers not delegated to the United States by the
Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to
the people."); BMW, 517 U.S. at 571 n.16 (1996) ("States are restricted within the orbits of
their lawful authority and upon the preservation of which the Government under the
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The United States Supreme Court has also ruled that vague laws
offend the Due Process Clause.'"A law is vague, and therefore void, if
people "of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning
and differ as to its application."'" A law that does not clearly define
the acts it prohibits "impermissibly delegates basic policy matters to
... judges ... and juries for resolution on an ad hoc and subjective
basis, with the attendant dangers of arbitrary and discriminatory ap-
plication" and "may trap the innocent by not providing fair warn-
nI80
The remainder of this Section examines case law that further il-
luminates these concerns in the context of the right of publicity and
other state law commercial torts."'
1. Dormant Commerce Clause
The United Slates Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, dubbed
the "Hollywood Circuit." 182
 because its jurisdiction includes California,
has had several occasions to construe California publicity rights law
and examine its conformance with constitutional principles. 183 Some
of these cases suggest that the right of publicity may be subject to con-
straints under the dormant Commerce Clause as well as other consti-
tutional provisions. 184
 In 1992, in White v. Samsung Electronics America,
Inc., a court panel held that. California's common law right of public-
ity gives a cause of action against a defendant's commercial use of any
Constitution depends." ((voting Huntington v. Aural, 146 U.S. 657, 669 (1892))); TRIBE,
supra note 153, § 6-1.
' 76 See Connally v. Gen. Constr. Co.. 269 U.S. 385, 390, 395 (1926); soul note 175 (Due
Process Clause); see also Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 732 (2000) (slating that a statute is
unconstitutionally vague If it fails to provide people of ordinary intelligence a reasonable
opportunity to understand what conduct it prohibits.")
179 Connally, 269 U.S. at 391.
180
 Grayned v. City of Rockford. 408 U.S. 104, 108-09 (1972).
181
 Although each of this section's cases suggests more than a single constitutional
claim, it summarizes each case under the subpart heading corresponding to one of the
constitutional issue it raises purely for organizational purposes.
162
 White v. Samsung Elecs. Am., Inc., 989 F.2d 1512. 1521 (9th Cir. 1993) (denial of
motion for rehearing) (Kozinski, J., dissenting).
183 E.g., Hoffman v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., 255 F.3d 1180 (9th Cir. 2001); Wendt v.
Host Lit'l, Inc., 197 F.3d 1284 (9th Cir. 1999); Abdul-Jabbar v. Gen. Motors Corp., 85 F.3d
407 (9th Cir. 1996); Waits v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 978 F.2d 1093 (9th Cir. 1992); White v. Sam-
sung Elecs. Am., Inc., 971 F.2d 1395 (9th Cir. 1992); Midler v. Ford Motor Co., 849 F.2d
460 (9th Cir. 1988).
IN See Wendt, 197 F.3d at 1288 (Kozinski. J., dissenting); White, 989 F.2d at 1518-19
(Kozinski, 1„ dissenting).
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set of a plaintiff's characteristics sufficient to evoke the plaintiff's
identity. 185
 Vanna White, who had achieved fame for her role as the
letter-turner for the game show Wheel of Fortune, complained about a
print advertisement Samsung was using to promote its electronics
products. 186
 The advertisement, one of a series that made improbable
but humorous predictions of the cultural landscape circa 2010, fea-
tured a robot wearing a blond wig, jewelry, a formal dress, and point-
ing to letters on a set reminiscent of Wheel of Fortune. 18 ` The advertis-
ing copy suggested that, although many things would likely change in
the future, Samsung's products would keep running.'" The United
States District Court for the Central District of California granted
summary judgment in Samsung's favor on White's common law and
statutory right of publicity claims, finding that the advertisement did
not include White's "likeness," a required element of California's
right of publicity statute. 189
 On appeal, the Ninth Circuit panel af-
firmed the district court's finding on the statutory claim, but reversed
and remanded for trial on the issue of whether White had a claim tin-
der California common law. m)
 The court devised that California's
common law right of publicity is not limited to protecting against use
of any enumerated set of a plaintiff's characteristics, but instead pro-
tects any use of one's identity that causes the audience to think of him
or her. 191
Samsung petitioned for an en bane rehearing. 192 Although both
the panel and full court declined to rehear the case, Judge Alex Koz-
inski, joined by Judges O'Scannlain and Kleinfeld, issued a vigorous
dissent in which he attacked the panel's holding on several
grounds. 193
 Much of the dissent focused on the need to balance pub-
licity rights against free speech rights granted by the First Amendment
and argued that the panel had not properly done so here!" The dis-
sent, however, also suggested that such a broad right of publicity of-
188 971 F.2d at 1398, 1399, 1402.
188 Id. at 1396.
187 Id. at 1396, 1399.
188 See id. at 1396.
189
 Id. at 1397.
192 White, 971 F.2d at 1397, 1399, 1402.
191 See id. at 1398-99.
192 989 F.2d at 1512.
193
 See id. at 1512-22 (Kozinski, J., dissenting).
194 See id. at 1512-17, 1519-21 (Kozinski, J., dissenting).
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fends more of the Constitution than just the First Amendment. 195 In-
voking the dormant Copyright Clause, Kozinski noted that the Su-
preme Court has held that "state intellectual property laws can stand
only so long as they don't 'prejudice the interests of other States." 196
Kozinski asserted that an out-of-state advertiser would be subject to
Ilse publicity law of a plaintiff's domicile state even if the advertiser
look care not to display the complained-of advertisement there be-
cause "[a] right of publicity created by one state applies to conduct
everywhere." 197 Kozinski continued:
The broader and more ill-defined one state's right of public-
ity, the more it interferes with the legitimate interests of other
states. A limited right that applies to unauthorized use of
name and likeness probably does not run afoul of the Copy-
right Clause, but the majority's protection of "identity" is
quite another story. 195
He also complained that the panel failed to analyze whether the re-
striction it was divining from the common law was "unconstitutionally
vague," suggesting it may not have sufficiently defined "identity" so as
to satisfy the requirements of due process. 199
Judge Kozinski found himself dissenting again seven years later
when a majority of his colleagues on the Ninth Circuit refused to re-
visit the panel decision in Wendt v. Host International, Inc. in 1999. 200
The case involved "triobots again," this time animatronic figures sit-
195 See id. at 1517-19 (Kozinski, J., dissenting).
198
 Id, at 1518 (Kozinski, J., dissenting) (quoting Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546,
558 (1973)).
197 See White, 989 F.2d at 1518 (Kozinski, J., dissenting).
198 Id. at 1519 (Kozinski, J., dissenting).
199
 See id. at 1519-20 & n.35 (Kozinski, J., dissenting) (citing Posada de P.R. Assocs. v.
Tourism Co.. 478 U.S. 328, 347 (1986)). The Supreme Court has repeatedly applied the
void-for-vngueness doctrine with stricter scrutiny to laws that threaten First Amendment
freedoms. See, e.g., Coates v. Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611, 614 (1971) (ordinance was "uncon-
stitutionally vague because it subjects the exercise of the right of assembly to an unascer-
tainable standard"); Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147, 151 (1959) ("LS] tricter standards of
permissible statutory vagueness may be applied to a statute having a potentially inhibiting
effect on speech; a man may the less be required to act at his peril here, because the free
dissemination of ideas may be the loser?); Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507, 509 (1948)
("It is settled that a statute so vague and indefinite, in form and as interpreted, as to per-
mit within the scope of its language the punishment of incidents fairly within the protec-
tion of the guarantee of free speech is void, on its face, as contrary to the Fourteenth
Amendment:).
200 125 F.3d 806 (9th Cir. 1997), ;dig denied. 197 F.3d 1284 (1999) (Kozinski, J., dissent-
ing).
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dug at defendant's Cheers-themed airport bars. 2°1
 Host had obtained a
license for this use from Paramount, which owned the copyright to
the Cheers television series. 2°2
 To make the bars more inviting, Host
decided to create figures that evoked show characters Norm (an
overweight and underemployed accountant) and Cliff (a know-it-all
postal worker) by making one fat and dressing the other as a mail car-
rier.2" Although the figures' faces did not look like the actors who
played Norm and Cliff, the actors objected, claiming that Host had
infringed their rights of publicity.204
 The district court granted sum-
mary for the defendants, finding that the robots did not resemble the
plaintiffs. 205
 Relying on White, a Ninth Circuit panel reversed, holding
that the case presented a jury question as to whether the robots were
sufficiently "like" the plaintiffs aslo violate their publicity rights." 6
Judge Kozinski's dissent, joined this time by Judges Mendel(' and
Tashima, reiterated many of the concerns he expressed in White, al-
though he seemed even more disturbed by this case because Host had
acquired a license to use the Cheers copyrights. 207
 Kozinski argued that
these rights, granted by the federal Copyright Act, should preempt
whatever publicity rights the plaintiffs have under the facts of this
case. 208
 He also pointed out that the court's decision put it in conflict
with the Seventh Circuit, which had held that the Copyright Act pre-
empts the right of publicity when the latter would prevent ordinary
use of the copyrighted work.2°9
 Kozinski then elaborated on his dor-
mant Copyright Clause concern from White, asserting that permitting
California's expansive publicity right to set the national standard for
permissible use of a licensed derivative work creates a "constitutional
conundrum."21°
 He also took the panel to task for applying Califor-
nia's publicity laws to Host's out-of-state activities. 211 Thus, Kozinski
2°n
	 F.3d at 1285 (Kozinski, J., dissenting).
202 Id. (Kozinski, J., dissenting).
205 Id. (Kozinski, J., dissenting).
204 Id. (Kozinski, J., dissenting).
205 Id. (Kozinski, J., dissenting).
206 Wendt. 197 F.3d at 1285-86 (Kozinski, J., dissenting).
207 See id. at 1286-87 (Kozinski, J., dissenting).
208 Id. at 1285-87 (Kozinski, J., dissenting).
2°9 Id. at 1287 (Kozinski, J., dissenting) (discussing Baltimore Orioles, Inc. v. Major
League Baseball Players Ass'n, 805 F.2d 663 (7th Cir. 1986)).
21° See id. at 1288 (Kozinski, J., dissenting).
211
 Wendt, 197 F.3d at 1288 (Kozinski, J., dissenting).
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suggested a potential Commerce Clause violation might exist when a
state applies its anomalous laws extraterritorially. 21 2
2. Due Process Clause
The United States Supreme Court's recent. Due Process jurispru-
dence suggests yet another potential constitutional limit on the scope
of the right of publicity.213
 In 1996, the Court addressed Due Process
and Commerce Clause concerns that can arise in cases involving state-
based right of publicity laws in BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore, al-
though the case involved a different commercial tort.. 214 The plaintiff,
Dr. Gore, bought a BMW sedan that an Alabama dealer sold him as
new. 215
 Nine months later, he brought it to a detailing shop where one
Mr. Slick, the proprietor, told him that someone had previously re-
painted the car.21G
 The defendant admitted to repainting the car be-
fore delivery because acid rain had damaged its finish in transit, but
denied that it had a duty to disclose this because it did not consider
the fact. material and had a nationwide policy of nondisclosure for
minor repairs. 217
 Dr. Gore claimed that BMW had a duty to disclose it
under Alabama's fraud statute because it reduced the value of his car
by about ten percent and was therefore material. 218 A jury agreed with
Dr. Gore, awarding him not only his $4,000 estimated loss of value but
also $4,000,000 in punitive damages.219
 BMW sought to have the puni-
tive damages set aside as excessive, arguing that its nondisclosure pol-
icy complied with all state laws that set forth disclosure obligations for
the automotive industry, which only about half of the states had in
place. 22°
 The strictest. of these laws compelled disclosure only when
the cost of repair exceeded three percent of the vehicle's sticker
price; BMW's cost. to repaint Dr. Gore's car did not exceed this
limit.221
 The jury appeared to have calculated the punitive damages
award using the number of vehicles nationwide that BMW had re-
212 See id. (Kozinski, J., dissenting).
218 See BMW 517 U.S. 559.
214 See id. at 562,571-72.
215 Id. at 563.
216 Sec id.
217 Id. at 563-64.
218 BMW, 517 U.S. at 563-64.
218 Id. at 565.
220 Id.
221 Id. at 564,565.
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paired without disclosure and sold as new as a multiplier; BMW ar-
gued the calculation should have excluded all cars sold in states
where its conduct was lawful.222
 The trial judge denied BMW's motion
and BMW appealed to the Alabama Supreme Court. 223 The court
affirmed the trial court's finding that the award was not excessive, but
ruled that the jury had improperly included sales in other jurisdic-
tions in its calculation. 224
 It issued a remittitur reducing the punitive
damages award to $2,000,000 based on its analysis of comparative
cases where juries awarded punitive damages for misrepresentation of
a vehicle's condition.'
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari and declared
the $2,000,000 punitive damages award unconstitutionally excessive,
in violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment.226 In reaching its decision, the Court seemed especially con-
cerned that Alabama imposed the penalty to deter BMW's lawful con-
duct outside of Alabama. 227
 It noted that automobile disclosure laws
were "a patchwork of rules representing the diverse policy judgments
of lawmakers in 50 States" and that, whereas Congress has authority to
enact a nationwide disclosure policy, "it is clear that no single State
could do so, or even impose its own policy choice on neighboring
States."228
 The Court stressed that both the Commerce Clause and the
need to respect the interests and policy choices of other states limit a
state's power to impose undue burdens on interstate commerce. 229 To
remain within these limits, the Court opined, a state must be able to
justify the sanctions it imposes by its interest in protecting its own
consumers and economy. 23°
 Hence, it held that Alabama could not
punish BMW for conduct that was lawful where it occurred and that
did not affect Alabama or its citizens. 231 The Court also held that Ala-
bama could not impose sanctions on BMW to deter conduct that is
lawful in other jurisdictions, noting that It] o punish a person be-
cause lie has done what the law plainly allows him to do is a due proc-
222 Sce id. at 567.
223
 BMW 517 U.S. at 566.
224 Id. at 566-67.
223 Id. at 567.
226 Id. at 568, 574-75.
227 Sec id. at 572-73.
228 BMW, 517 U.S. at 570, 571.
229 Sec id. at 571, 572, 585.
232
 Id. at 572.
231 Id. at 572-73.
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ess violation of the most basic sort." 282 The element of surprise in-
volved in this case also troubled the Court, which felt that. BMW had
reasonably relied on state disclosure statutes in implementing a policy
that coincided with the strictest extant statute. 233 The Court stressed
that lejlementary notions of fairness enshrined in our constitutional
jurisprudence dictate that a person receive fair notice . . . of the con-
duct that will subject him to punishment." and that the Due Process
Clause affords basic protection against judgments without notice in
cases involving civil penalties. 234 The Court's opinion makes it clear
that a state violates the Due Process Clause when it holds a party liable
where that party had no way to know its activities were unlawful. 235
This can result particularly when a court seeks to enforce an anoma-
lous C0111111011 law whose breadth it had not previously articulated. 235
3, Nationwide Injunctions Based on State Law
Courts have been reluctant to issue nationwide injunctions based
on violations of one state's law when the complained-of acts are legal
in many other states.'" Although courts typically opine that their ju-
risdiction over the parties gives them the power to issue such injunc-
tions, they typically defer to notions of comity when limiting the geo-
graphic scope of their injunctions." 8 This begs the question of
whether issuing nationwide injunctions in such cases may violate the
Due Process, Full Faith and Credit,"9 or Commerce Clauses. 2" En-
joining lawful acts in State A based on a ruling that they infringe on
rights granted by State B would seem to discredit the laws of State
232 Id. at 573 (quoting Bordenkircher v. Hayes. 434 U.S. 357, 363 (1978)).
233 Sec BMW 517 U.S. at 565, 579, 577, 579.
234 Sec id. at 574 & n.22.
233 Sec id.
236 Sec id.
237 See, e.g., Herman Miller, Inc. v. Palazzetti Imps. & Exps., Inc., 270 F.3d 298, 327 (6th
Cir. 2001); Hyatt Corp. v. Hyatt Legal Servs., 610 F. Sum). 381, 385 (N.D. Ill. 1985).
235 See, e.g., Hyatt, 610 F. Stipp. at 383.
239 U.S. CoNsT. art. IV, § 1 ("Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each State to the
public Acts, Records, and judicial Proceedings of every other State.").
245 Sec Paul Heald, Comment, Unfair Competition and Federal Law: Constitutional Re-
straints on the Scope of State Law, 54 U. Cut. L. Rev. 1411, 1412 (1987) ("issuing nationwide
injunctions after deciding multistate unfair competition actions under the anomalous law
of a single state „ • can offend the commerce, due process, and full faith and credit
clauses of the Constitution.").
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A.241 Depending on the acts enjoined, State B's issuance of such in-
junctions may also impermissibly regulate interstate commerce.242
In 2001, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit,
in Herman Millet; Inc. v. Palazzetti Imports & Exports, Inc., faced these
issues in deciding the scope of an injunction enjoining acts that in-
fringed on the plaintiff's right of publicity under Michigan common
laW. 243
 The case involved two competing furniture companies selling a
"potato chip" lounge chair and ottoman originally designed by Char-
les and Ray Eames exclusively for Herman Miller, Inc. 244 Herman
Miller had obtained the Eatnes's publicity rights from their estate in
1990.245
 Palazzetti, a New York corporation with its principal office in
New York City, marketed reproductions of popular classic furniture
styles and began marketing a reproduction of the Eames-designed
lounge chair and ottoman in 1989, identifying it as such in advertise-
ments.246 Herman Miller filed suit in the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Michigan, alleging inter alia that Palazzetti's
conduct violated its publicity rights in the Eames name. 247 The district
court held that Michigan law applied to the claim and devised that its
common law recognizes a post-mortem right of publicity even though
Michigan courts had yet to determine the more basic issue of whether
a right of publicity exists at all under its laws. 248
 After a trial, the jury
returned a verdict against Palazzetti on the right of publicity claim. 249
The court then issued a permanent, nationwide injunction enjoining
Palazzetti from using the names and likenesses of Charles or Ray
Eames in conjunction with its furniture.25°
Palazzetti appealed the court's recognition of a post-mortem right
of publicity under Michigan law as well as its granting of a nationwide
injunction.251
 The Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision
on the descendible right of publicity, reasoning that Michigan's clear
recognition of a right to privacy sufficiently supported such a find-
241 Sec David S. Welkowitz, Preemption, Extraterritoriality, and the Problem of State Antidilu-
tion Laws, 67 Tut.. L. REV. 1, 77 (1992).
242 Sec id. at 31.
243 270 F.3d 298, 326-27 (6th Cir. 2001).
244 Id. at 301-02.
249
 Id. at 302.
248 Id. at 304-05.
247
 Id. at 306.
248
 Herman Miller, 270 F.3d at 307.
249 Id.
299 Id.
291 Id. at 324, 326.
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ing.252 The court, however, held that the district court abused its dis-
cretion by granting a nationwide injunction because it effectively
forced the right of publicity on states that do not acknowledge it. 253
Reasoning that it would be unfair to enforce Michigan law in states
such as New York—Palazzetti's primary place of business—that had ex-
plicitly rejected a post-mortem right of publicity; the court excluded
such states from the scope of the injunction:254
In 1985, the United States District Court for the Northern District
of Illinois in Hyatt Coif). u Hyatt Legal Services expressed significant
concern over the constitutionality of issuing a nationwide injunction
dictated by the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
in its remand instructions. 255 The Seventh Circuit had held that the
defendant's use of the name "Hyatt" probably violated the Illinois
anti-dilution statute and granted an injunction enjoining defendant's
use of the name "Hyatt Legal Services."256 Although the district court
claimed it had the power to issue a nationwide injunction, it decided
that there was "a conflict between an interpretation of the anti-
dilution law which allows for a nationwide injunction and the com-
merce clause of the United States Constitution,"257 The court noted
that the Supreme Court's Commerce Clause jurisprudence prohibits
states from (a) directly regulating interstate commerce and (b) inci-
dentally regulating interstate commerce more than is necessary to
further the state's legitimate interests. 258 Because "[a]dvertising is an
inevitable and often vital aspect of interstate commerce," the court
reasoned that an injunction prohibiting advertisements disseminated
outside of Illinois and intended for consumers of other states ap-
peared to interfere directly with interstate commerce, thereby run-
252 See id. at 324-26.
2" See Herman Alines; 270 F.3d at 327.
2" Id. at 326-27.
255 610 F. Stipp. at 385-86.
256 Id. at 381. The parties agreed the firm (where defendant Joel Hyatt was a partner)
could use the name J. Hyatt Legal Services," subject to certain safeguards. Id. at 381, 382.
Although the American Bar Association does not require that firm names include the
names of any of their members, it does require that advertisements for legal services in-
chide the name of at least one lawyer responsible for the advertisement's content. MODEL
RULES OF PROCL CONDUCF R. 7.2(d), 7.5 cmt. (2001).
257 Hyatt, 610 F. Stipp. at 383.
258 Id. at 383 (citing Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S.624, 640 (1982)).
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ring afoul of the Commerce Clause2 59
 Even if it considered the ef-
fects of the regulation on interstate commerce to be incidental rather
than direct, the court reasoned that the Commerce Clause would still
forbid a nationwide injunction because the incidental effects of such
an injunction outweighed the local interests it sought to protect. 26')
Particularly troublesome to the court was the prospect of an Illinois
statute affecting an Ohio legal office's intrastate marketing of its serv-
ices to clients in Ohio, a state that had no anti-dilution statute: 26i
 That
"[Ole rights accorded plaintiff by Illinois are not of a nature com-
monly recognized elsewhere" and that the "policy decisions respect-
ing scope of protection have differed" in various states also contrib-
uted to the court's conclusion. 262
 The court opined that imposing
anomalous Illinois law on "those states that have chosen not to pass
such a law, in some cases possibly an explicit choice, or upon those
who have interpreted their statute differently, seems anathema to our
federal system."263
 Nevertheless, the court was compelled to enter the
nationwide injunction because that is what the Seventh Cir-cuit had
warranted on remand.2" Citing "the strong possibility of a constitu-
tional infirmity," however, it temporarily stayed the injunction as to
advertisements not expected to appear in Illinois to give the defen-
dant time to mount an appea1. 265
More recently, in 1995 the United States District Court for the
Southern District of New York held in Deere & Co. v. MTD Products,
Inc. that MTD's television advertisements diluted Deere's trademark
of a leaping male deer under New York's anti-dilution statute."'''' Al-
though claiming it too had the power to issue a nationwide injunc-
tion, the court decided that interests of comity strongly favored a lim-
ited injunction in this case.267
 That approximately half of the states
had no anti-dilution law, and that even those states that did may not
259 Id. at 383-84; see also Welkowitz, supra note 241, at 83 (asserting that a state cannot
regulate nationwide advertising, and can only regulate regional advertising via an injunc-
tion when the policies of all other affected states would permit such regulation).
26° See Hyatt, 610 F. Stipp. at 384-85.
261 See id. at 385.
262 Id. at 384,385.
265"
	 id. at 385.
264 Id.
265
 See Hyatt, 610 F. Stipp. at 386.
266 No. 94 CIV. 2322 (DLC), 1995 WL 81299, *1 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 28, 1995).
267 Id. at *5.
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have prohibited MTD's complained-of use, persuaded the court to
limit the injunction to the confines of New York State. 268
III. ANALYSIS
An analysis of the preceding case law suggests that certain aspects
of state-based right of publicity laws may offend provisions of the Con-
stitution beyond the First. Amendment and the Copyright Clause. 269 In
particular, publicity rights may violate the Commerce, Full Faith and
Credit, and Due Process Clauses. 27°
A. State Right of Publicity Laws Violate the Commerce Clause
As suggested by several of the cases described in Section II, a state's
publicity laws violate the dormant Commerce Clause when they pre-
vent an out-of-state actor from conducting commercial activities that
are lawful in the state where they occur. 271
 Upholding broad publicity
laws risks allowing a state to set a national advertising standard be-
cause nationwide advertisers have to conform their advertising to the
strictest laws or else incur the expense of producing multiple adver-
tisements for use in different states. 272
 Restricting advertising in this
manner is an impermissible restraint on interstate commerce. 273
As noted earlier, the United States Supreme Court's Commerce
Clause jurisprudence prohibits a state from (a) directly regulating
interstate commerce and (b) incidentally regulating interstate com-
merce more than is necessary to further the state's legitimate inter-
2€8 See id. at *5, *6, *7.
269 See supra notes 184-268 and accompanying text.
270 Sec id.
271 See, e.g., BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 585 (1996); Hyatt Corp. v. Hyatt
Legal Servs., 610 F. Supp. 381, 383-84 (N.D. Ill. 1985).
272 See, e.g., Kassel v. Consol. Freightways, 450 U.S. 662, 674 (1981) (holding a state law
regulating the length of trucks invalid under the Commerce Clause because it posed an
undue burden on interstate commerce); Wendt v. Host Ina Inc., 197 F.3d 1284, 1288 (9th
Cii. 1999) (denial of motion for rehearing) (Kozinski, J., dissenting) (arguing that enforc-
ing California's right of publicity beyond California's borders impermissibly sets a national
standard for what is an allowable use); Welkowitz, supra note 241. at 64 ("1W)hen a state
places itself in a position to provide the national standard for conduct, it has crossed the
line of legitimate regulation."); Eades, supra note 72, at 1330 ("Indiana l's right of publicity
statute] is essentially imposing nationwide restrictions an production because the rational
manufacturer is unlikely to alter distribution based on individual differences in state law.
The simpler answer is to comply with the most expansive statute • „ .“).
273 See, e.g., Kassel, 450 U.S. at 674; Wendt 197 F.3d at 1288 (Kozinski, J., dissenting);
Welkowitz, supra note 241. at 64; Eades, supra note 72, at 1330.
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ests. 274
 As the United States District Court for the Northern District of
Illinois reasoned in Hyatt Corp. v. Hyatt Legal Services, a state law that
restricts advertising outside of that state directly regulates interstate
commerce because of the vital role advertising plays in the nation's
economy. 275
 Even if a court deems this effect incidental rather than
direct, such regulation seems excessive in light of the local interests
publicity laws further.27° To survive Commerce Clause scrutiny, the
Court has traditionally required state laws effecting interstate com-
merce to serve a legitimate local purpose, such as protecting safely or
health, which cannot be served as well by less burdensome means. 277
Protecting the commercial value of a resident celebrity's identity is
probably not a sufficiently compelling state interest to offset the sub-
stantial regulatory effect a state's publicity laws can have on interstate
commerce.278
 The reasons the United States Court of Appeals for the
Tenth Circuit gave in Cardloons, L.C. v. Major League Baseball Players
Association for holding that the interests served by the right of public-
ity were too weak to justify restrictions on First Amendment. rights also
largely support this conclusion. 279 Moreover, the argument that a
state's common law right of publicity serves a legitimate local purpose
seems particularly vulnerable when the state's legislature did not even
274 See supra note 258 and accompanying text.
275 Hyatt, 610 F. Stipp. at 383 (citing Hunt v Wash. State Apple Advert. Coman, 432
U.S. 333 (1977)); see also Eades, supra note 72, at 1329-30 (noting that Indiana's right of
publicity statute imposes significant burdens on interstate commerce by restricting adver-
tising as well as merchandising).
276 See, e.g., Cardtoons, L.C. v. Major League Baseball Players Ass'n, 95 F.3d 959,973-76
(10th Cir. 1996) (reviewing the justifications for the right of publicity and finding them
uncompelling); cf. Hyatt. 610 F. Supp. at 384-85 (holding that a nationwide injunction
would place an excessive burden on interstate commerce in light of the interest sought to
be protected by a state's anti-dilution statute, even where the effect on commerce is inci-
dental). "
277 See, e.g., Kassel, 450 U.S. at 674 (holding a state law regulating the length of trucks
invalid under the Commerce Clause because it posed an undue burden on interstate
commerce without any significant countervailing safety interest); Hyatt, 610 F. Stipp. at 384
(asserting that statutes designed to protect health and welfare, as well as purely local inter-
ests, are favored over those designed to protect employment, profits and nationwide inter-
ests).
278 See, e.g., Kasse4 450 U.S. at 674; Cardtoons, 95 F.3d at 973-76; Hyatt, 610 F. Supp. at
384.
279 See Cardtoons, 95 F.3d at 973-76; see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR 3 OMPE-
'irmoN § 46 cmt. c (1995) ( -The rationales underlying recognition of a right of publicity
are generally less compelling than those that justify rights in trademarks or trade secrets.");
Marlow, supra note 5, at 178-240 (reviewing justifications offered for the right of publicity
and arguing that they are not compelling); Steven C. Clay, Note, Stalstruch: The Overexten-
sion of Celebrity Publicity Rights in State and Federal Courts, 79 MINN. L. REV. 485, 501-06
(1994) (same).
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feel compelled to act to protect the interest. 280 Such an argument be-
comes weaker still when a federal court broadens a state's common
law, because no slate lawmaking body has felt compelled to regard the
right as broadly. 281 This is especially so in states like California, where
federal courts have expanded the scope of the right under common
law beyond what is granted by statute. 282
The Supreme Court, by upholding a state publicity law in Zacchini
v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., demonstrated that state publicity
rights are not per se unconstitutional. 283 Zacchini, however, did not
involve the regulation of interstate commerce in any fashion because
the infringing use was a broadcast on a local news program. 284 Moreo-
ver, the Court sought to protect Zacchini's ability to earn a living, be-
cause the newscast appropriated his entire daredevil act. 285 As noted
earlier, Zucchini is not. a typical right of publicity case. 286 Plaintiffs in
most publicity rights cases have primary occupations through which
they built up economic value in their identities; the defendants' ap-
propriation is not of their primary act but of this secondary economic
value created by their fame. 287 The interest protected by publicity laws
is not nearly as compelling in these more common cases because the
defendants are not threatening the plaintiffs' ability to earn a liv-
ing. 288 Thus, the Court's decision in Zacchini does not mean that state
right of publicity laws are constitutional in the more typical cases in-
"a See supra note 54 for the eleven states that provide only a common law right of
publicity
281 See White v. Samsung Elect, Am., Inc., 971 F.2d 1395, 1397-99 (9th Cir. 1992) (hold-
ing that California common law protects plaintiff's "identity" even though the state courts
had not interpreted it as broadly); cf. Browning-Ferris Indus. v. Kelco Disposal. Inc., 492
U.S. 257. 281 (1989) (Brennan, J., concurring) (10Jur scrutiny of awards made without
the benefit of a legislature's deliberation and guidance would be less indulgent than our
consideration of those that fall within statutory limits.").
282 See White, 989 F.2d 1512. 1519 (9th Cir. 1993) (denial of motion for rehearing)
(Kozinski, J., dissenting) ("No California statute, no California court has actually tried to
reach this far. It is ironic that it is we who plant this kudzu in the fertile soil of our federal
system.").
283 SCC 433 U.S. 562, 577 (1977).
2134 See id. at 564.
2133 Sec id. at 574-75.
200 See supra note 65 and accompanying text.
282 Sec id.
288 See Zacchini, 433 U.S. at 576 ("[T]he strongest case for a 'right of publicity' in-
volv[es], not the appropriation of an entertainer's reputation to enhance the attractiveness
of a commercial product, but the appropriation of the very activity by which the enter-
tainer acquired his reputation in the first place.").
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volving unauthorized use of a celebrity's identity in interstate corn-
merce. 289
. B. Vague Right of Publicity Laws Violate the Due Process Clause
California's common law right of publicity, as articulated by the
panels of the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in
White v. Samsung Electronics America, Inc. and Wendt v. Host International,
Inc., violates Due Process. 29° The law's prohibition against unauthor-
ized use of another's "identity" is too vague to give parties fair notice
of the specific uses that may subject them to liability. 291
State courts typically limit the right of publicity to the use of a ce-
lebrity's name, voice, face, or signature. 292
 An advertiser can generally
avoid using any of these specific characteristics. 293 In White, however,
the Ninth Circuit expanded the right such that a court may deem any-
thing that happens to remind someone of a celebrity to be a use of
that celebrity's identity. 291
 As Judge Kozinski noted in White:
any time anybody in the United States—even somebody who
lives in a state with a very narrow right of publicity—creates
an ad, he takes the risk that it might remind some segment
of the public of somebody, perhaps somebody with only a lo-
cal reputation, somebody the advertiser has never heard
of.... So you made a commercial in Florida and one of the
characters reminds Reno residents of their favorite local TV
anchor (a California domiciliary)? Pay up. 295
Under California law, the celebrity would be able to hold the adver-
tiser liable for infringing his or her publicity right, even though any
resemblance was purely coincidental, because the common law does
289 See id.; see also Eugene Volokh, The Mechanisms of the Slippery Slope, 116 HAnv.L. REV.
1026, 1090 (2003) ("Zacchiii is regularly cited [wrongly] for the very proposition that the
Court explicitly refused to decide: that the more common version of the 'right of public-
ity'—the right to control many uses of one's name or likeness—is constitutional.").
29° See BMW 517 U.S. at 574; Wendt, 125 F.3d at 811-12; White, 971 F.2d at 1397-99; see
also Heald, supra note 240, at 1426 (arguing that subjecting a defendant to a nationwide
injunction based solely on a single state's anomalous law involves a strong element of sur-
prise, raising potential due process and full faith and credit questions).
591 See BMW, 517 U.S. at 574; White, 971 F.2d at 1397-99.




 White, 989 F.2d at 1519 (denial of motion for rehearing) (Kozinski. J., dissenting).
2003]	 Constitutional Restraints on State Right of Publicity Laws 	 895
not require intentional appropriation . 296
 Because such a scenario
would expose an advertiser to liability without notice, California's
common law right of publicity violates the Due Process Clause on
these facts. 297 It "fails to provide people of ordinary intelligence a rea-
sonable opportunity to understand what conduct it prohibits," and is
therefore unconstitutionally vague. 298
C. Courts must tailor remedies to right of publicity claims
Once a court finds a defendant liable for infringing a plaintiff's
publicity rights, it must fashion an appropriate retne4 299 Two com-
mon remedies are injunctions enjoining the defendant from continu-
ing to infringe the plaintiff's rights, and damages to reflect the eco-
nomic harm clone to the plaintiff.") A court must tailor each of these
remedies with care to avoid constitutional problems. 30 '
The principal concern with fashioning an injunction is the geo-
graphical extent to which the injunction applies. 302 As noted earlier,
the notion of issuing an injunction to enjoin out -of-state conduct that
was lawful where it occurred troubled the courts in Herman Millet; Inc.
v. Palazzetti Imports & Exports, Inc., Deere & Co. v. MTD Products, Inc.,
296 See id. at 1515 n.17 (Kozinski, j„ dissenting). Consider the circumstances surround-
ing British rock musician Peter Gabriel's recent song, The Barry Williams Show. criticizing
television culture, PETER GABRIEL, The Barry Williams Show, on UP (Interscope Records
2002); see Steve Hochman, For Someone Who's No Fan of the Show, Peter Gabriel Has a Very
'Brady' Moment, Los ANGELES TIMES, July 28, 2002, at F62, available at 2002 NN.. 2492992.
Gabriel claims that he chose the name "effectively out of a hat" and did not know that
Barry Williams is the actor who played Greg Brady on the 1970s American television series
The Brady Bunch. Id. Although the First Amendment would almost certainly privilege his
use of the name, see supra notes 90-91 and accompany text, Gabriel nonetheless gave the
actor a cameo role in the song's music video, See Robert Kahn, A Very Brady Bit Part, Nt:ws-
DAY, Aug. 19, 2002, at All, available at 2002 WI, 2758680.
297 See BMW 517 U.S. at 574.
298 See Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 731 (2000). See also supra note 199 for cases
where the Court applied the void•for-vagueness doctrine with particularly strict scrutiny to
laws that implicated First Amendment freedoms.
299 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 46.
"0 See id. §§ 48, 49. Monetary relief can be determined alternatively on a restitution
basis using two measures: the fair market value of the unauthorized use or the defendant's
profits attributable to an unauthorized use. Id. § 49 cmt. d.
"I See, e.g., BMW 517 U.S. at 571-74; Hyatt, 610 F. Stipp. at 383; Welkowitz, supra note
241, at 18 (In the absence of a Uniform federal statute no state can give complete relief to
the plaintiff without a potential encroachment on the rights of a sister state.").
302 See. e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPEATI1ON § 48 cmt. c.
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and Hyatt. 3" In Deere, The United States District Court for the South-
ern District of New York invoked considerations of comity in seeking
to limit the injunction to only those states where the complained-of
action was unlawfuL 304 Although the Restatement (Third) of Unfair Com-
petition notes that issuing "an injunction under state law prohibiting
otherwise lawful conduct in another state raises serious concerns," it
does not identify those serious concerns with particularity. 805 Instead,
it notes, "an injunction protecting the right of publicity should ordi-
narily be limited to conduct in jurisdictions that provide protection
comparable to the forum state," thereby avoiding such concerns. 806 It
also suggests placing the burden on the defendant to request mod-
ification of a multi-state injunction, requiring the defendant to show
that the conduct is lawful in one or more of the target states. 307
The serious concerns the Restatement alludes to no doubt include
the "strong possibility of a constitutional infirmity" resulting from a
state issuing a geographically unlimited injunction.3" To comply with
the Commerce and Full Faith and Credit Clauses, courts must limit
injunctions in right of publicity cases to just those states where the
complained-of use is unlawful. 309 Doing otherwise offends the Com-
merce clause because the forum state would effectively be regulating
commerce in other states.31 ° Broad injunctions also offend the Full
303 See Herman Miller, Inc. v. Palazzetti Imps. & Exps., Inc., 270 F.3d 298,326-27 (6th
Cir. 2001); Deere & Co. v. MTD Prods., Inc.. 1995 WI, 81299, *1, *5-6 (S.D.N.1: Feb. 28,
1995); Hyatt, 610 F. Supp. at 385.
304 Deere, 1995 WL 81299 at *5. But see Welkowitz, sup., note 241, at 23 ("The under-
currents of pertinent Supreme Court decisions are more than a principle of simple comity
or accommodation. There appears to be a constitutionally mandated structure that
prohibits certain extensions of state power .... that ... exists to restrict power in the fed-
eral system of interstate relations.").




303 Hyatt, 610 F. Stipp. at 386; see, e.g., Heald, supra note 239, at 1417-27 (discussing
constitutional defects of multi-state injunctions tinder the Commerce, Due Process, and
Full Faith and Credit Clauses).
309 Cf. Hyatt, 610 F. Supp. at 383 (holding that construing Illinois's anti-dilution law as
allowing for a nationwide injunction conflicts with the Commerce Clause); Welkowitz,
supra note 241, at 77 ("[Fitill faith and credit imposes an obligation on states not to
overreach by imposing their will in areas properly regulated by other states."). Professor
Welkowitz argues that the Commerce Clause may be a more suitable provision than the
Full Faith and Credit Clause from which to derive limits on a state's power to fashion a
remedy. See Welkowitz, supra note 241, at 77; see also Heald, supra note 240, at 1420-27
(suggesting that extraterritorial application of a state's anomalous unfair competition law
may offend the Commerce and Full Faith and Credit Clauses).
3 ' 0 See, e.g., BMW, 517 U.S. at 571-72.
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Faith and Credit Clause by effectively extending the forum state's
right of publicity to states that do not recognize it (or that have a nar-
rower right).'" The forum state would be placing its policy judgment
regarding the right of publicity above those of other states that have
chosen not to prohibit the complained-of use; in so doing, it would
not be giving the requisite full credit to the public acts of those other
states.312
 To avoid these infirmities, the burden should be on the
court, and not the defendant, to limit the injunction ab initio to only
those states where the conduct is unlawful. 313
Courts must also exercise care in fashioning compensatory damage
awards in right of publicity cases by excluding from the calculation
the monetary value of damage caused by lawful out-of-state con-
duct. 9 " The Supreme Court held in BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore
that a forum state must disregard out-of-state lawful conduct when
calculating damages.515
 The Court also held that it is inappropriate
for a state to use its judicial power to award damages in part to deter a
defendant from engaging in lawful out-of-state conduct.si° To con-
form to these requirements, a court must consider precisely where the
plaintiff's injury occurred. 317
 Suppose, for example, a court found
that a plaintiffs publicity value dropped by $500,000 because of the
defendant's conduct. 518
 One might argue that the injury occurred
entirely in the forum state, as would be the case for defamation. 319
Alternatively, one might argue, perhaps more realistically, that some
'" See, e.g.. Herman Millet: 270 F.3d at 327; cf. Eades, supra note 72, at 1331 (asserting
that Indiana's right of publicity statute, which lacks a domicile requirement, violates "legis-
lative due process" because it overrides the policy choices of the state that controls the
disposition of intestate property, which may not recognize a post-mortem right of public-
ity).
312 See Welkowitz, supra note 291, at 77. This could be termed a reverse Full Faith and
Credit argument, as the Clause is typically construed as requiring a state to enforce judg-
ments rendered in other states. See Baker V. Gels. Motors Corp.. 522 U.S. 222, 232-33
(1998). See supra note 239 for text of the Full Faith and Credit Clause.
3" But see supra note 307 and accompanying text.
3" See EM11; 517 U.S. at 572-74.
313 See id. at 573-74.
318 See id. at 572.
317
 Sec id. at 574.
318
 It can be difficult, however, to prove "the amount of loss and a causal connection
with the defendant's appropriation." RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION g 48
cmt. b.
3" See, e.g., Gordy v. Daily News, L.P., 95 F.3d 829, 833 (9th Cir. 1996) ("It is reasonable
to expect the bulk of the harm from defamation of an individual to be felt at his domicile."
(citing Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 465 U.S. 770 (1984))); Heald. supra note 240, at
1425 (noting that a plaintiff could argue that all the damage it suffers nationwide comes to
rest at plaintiff's principal place of business).
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part of the injury occurred in each state where the plaintiffs publicity
had an economic value and where the defendant's conduct dimin-
ished that value.320 If $200,000 of the injury occurred in states where
the defendant's conduct was lawful, the court must exclude this
amount from the damages to comply with BMVV. 321
D. A Preemptive Federal Right of Publicity Statute or Narrower State Laws Are
Alternative Ways of Addressing These Issues
Several commentators have called for a federal right of publicity to
resolve many of the issues raised by the patchwork of state publicity
laws.322 A federal right of publicity statute that preempts state publicity
laws, both common and statutory, would solve the Commerce Clause
and Full Faith and Credit problems identified in this Note. 323 As dis-
cussed earlier, the Commerce Clause of the Constitution expressly
authorizes Congress to regulate interstate commerce while severely
restricting states from doing so. 324 Congress has used this power to
enact federal trademark laws, which regulate interstate commerce in
part via advertising, and could rely on this same authority to enact a
federal right of publicity statute.325 Once such preempting legislation
is in place, creating a nationwide standard under federal law, the
dormant Commerce Clause and Full Faith and Credit issues raised by
state-based publicity rights would evaporate.326 Such a federal statute
should also include provisions to ensure an appropriate balance be-
tween publicity rights and those arising under the First Amendment
and the Copyright Act. 327
If such a federal right of publicity statute required a plaintiff to
prove intent and avoided vague terms such as "identity," it would also
address the Due Process concerns identified herein. 328 Such a statute
would give defendants fair warning by making it clear precisely what
325 See BMW, 517 U.S. at 573-74.
52l See id.
522 See, e.g., Friel Goodman, A National Identity Crisis: The Need for a Federal Right of Pub-
licity Statute, 9 J. Awe & Ewe, L. 227 (1999); Robinson, supra note 72, at 201-07.
525 See supra notes 271-289,299-321 and accompanying text.
524 See supra notes 173-177 and accompanying text.
325 See, e.g., Federal Trademark Dilution Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1125(c), 1127 (2000) (Lan-
ham Act §§ 43(c), 45).
325 Sec supra note 153 and accompanying text.
327 See supra notes 146-152 and accompanying text.
323 See, e.g., Wendt, 197 F.3d at 1286 (Kozinski, J., dissenting); see also Goodman, supra
note 322, at 250-277 (describing the scope, and presenting a draft, of proposed federal
legislation).
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uses would subject them to liability. 3
 It could also authorize courts to
issue nationwide injunctions and calculate damages without regard to
the extent of publicity rights ,granted under the laws of the various
states. 33°
As an alternative to federalization, the country's state and federal
legislative and judicial branches may instead resolve the constitutional
issues raised by state-based right of publicity laws in other ways."' For
example, state publicity laws may grow more similar over time, yield-
ing a clearer set of rules like those found in most. other torts recog-
nized under state law. 332 Alternatively, courts could tailor their en-
forcement of state publicity laws to avoid constitutional probletns. 333
The state-based approach may be favored in the interest of preserv-
ing state sovereignty in a federal system." 4 The federal approach,
however, has the advantage of creating a trite national standard in an
area that significantly affects interstate commerce." 5 Such a standard
could create a higher degree of certainty for both plaintiffs and
would-be defendants than is the case under the state-based system,
and likely would be easier for courts to administer. 3"
CONCLUSION
Courts must tread carefully when handling right of publicity cases.
To avoid constitutional infirmities, they must consider a variety of
First Amendment, Copyright Clause, Commerce Clause, Due Process
Clause, and Full Faith and Credit Clause issues in reaching decisions
and fashioning remedies. Congress could eliminate these hurdles by
328 See, e.g., Hill, 530 U.S. at 731; BMW 517 U.S. at 574.
338 See supra notes 302-321 and accompanying text,
$51 See, e.g., BMW 517 U.S. at 572, 573-74; Herman Millen 270 F.3d at 327; Wendt. 197
F.3d at 1286 (Kozinski, J., dissenting).
332 The Restatement can provide consistency in this area as more states follow it. Sec Re-
STATENIENT (Titian) OF UNFAIR COMPETTIION §§ 46-49. The National Conference of
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws could also promulgate a model state statute. See
generally Uniform Law Commissioners, at http://www.nccusl.org .
333 See, e.g., BMW 517 U.S. at 572, 573-74 (disregarding acts that were lawful in the
state they took place when determining remedies); Herman Millen 270 E3d at 327 (limiting
geographical scope of an injunction); Wendt, 197 F.3d at 1286 (Kozinski, J., dissenting)
(arguing for limiting the right of publicity to appropriation of specific personal character-
istics), See also SIIPM note 59 and accompanying text for arguments that federal courts
should resolve novel issues of stale publicity law through certification to the forum state's
high court.
" Sec supm note 177.
333 See, e.g., Hyatt, 610 F.Supp at 383-84.
338 See, e.g., Goodman, supra note 322, at 228, 242-44.
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enacting a preemptive federal right of publicity statute, thereby sim-
plifying this idiosyncratic area of the law. Alternatively, courts must
construe and enforce state publicity laws narrowly to avoid constitu-
tional issues.
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